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The Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the 
Post-World War II Soviet Union
Franziska Exeler
In early 1943, the tide turned on the Eastern Front. In a series of counteroff en-
sives, the Red Army reclaimed the Soviet western regions from the Germans. 
As Soviet forces reconquered more and more territory, one task held high pri-
ority: determining who had and who had allegedly not been loyal to the Soviet 
Union during the months and years of Moscow’s absence. Above all, members 
of the secret police, the judiciary and procuracy, and party representatives 
on diff erent levels of the state apparatus were engaged in this process. In the 
article, I analyze how the returning Soviet authorities dealt with people who 
had lived in German-occupied territory during the war. I discuss divergent 
understandings of guilt, and examine means of punishment, retribution and 
justice. The focus is on Belorussia, a Soviet republic that was occupied by 
the Germans from 1941 to 1944, and as such found itself at the center of Nazi-
Soviet war. However, the article also integrates research on Ukraine, Russia 
and the Baltic republics, therefore allowing for a broader picture of Moscow’s 
politics of retribution and the kind of Soviet state that emerged from the war.
In the aft ermath of the Second World War, the search for those accused 
of being traitors and collaborators took place in each country that had been 
under foreign occupation.1 Indeed, when it came to trials, governments in 
both Europe and Asia prosecuted more of their own nationals for treason than 
captured enemy soldiers (primarily German or Japanese) for wartime atroci-
ties.2 The most active country was the Soviet Union. Until 1956, Soviet military 
Earlier versions of this article were presented at workshops at Columbia University, Prince-
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Studies, Centre Marc Bloch Berlin, Georgetown University, Stanford University, and the 
European Humanities University in Vilnius. I thank the participants for their construc-
tive comments. I would also like to thank Harriet Murav and the anonymous reviewers 
for their very helpful suggestions. Research and writing of this article were supported by 
grants and fellowships from Princeton University, the Princeton Institute for International 
and Regional Studies, the Social Science Research Council (International Dissertation Re-
search Fellowship, with funds from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation), the Max Weber 
Program at the European University Institute, and the International Center for the History 
and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences at the Higher School of Economics 
in Moscow.
1.  István Deak, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., The Politics of Retribution in Europe: 
World War II and Its Aft ermath (Princeton, 2000); Konrad M. Lawson, “Wartime Atrocities 
and the Politics of Treason in the Ruins of the Japanese Empire, 1937–1953” (Ph.D. diss., 
Harvard University, 2012).
2. In Asia, the Allies, including China under the Nationalist Party, carried out about 
2,244 military trials from 1945 to 1951/52 that involved about 5,700 defendants, of whom 
984 were executed and another 3,419 sentenced to prison terms while 1,018, about 18 per-
cent of the defendants, were acquitted. Yuma Totani, Justice in Asia and the Pacifi c Re-
gion, 1945–1952: Allied War Crimes Prosecutions (Cambridge, Eng., 2015), 9; Barak Kush-
ner, Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice (Cambridge, 
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courts prosecuted and convicted about 34,000 German soldiers, more than 
any other country that had participated in the war.3 They also tried about 
2,883 Japanese soldiers, and probably a few hundred or even thousand other 
European Axis soldiers (Romanians, Hungarians, Austrians and others).4 At 
the same time, the Soviet state prosecuted even more of its own nationals: 
until the death of Stalin in 1953, 260,000 Soviet citizens were arrested for 
“treason and helping the German occupiers” (predatel s΄tvo i posobnichestvo 
nemetskim okkupantam) and another 358,000 for “treason” (izmena rodine, 
literally “betrayal of the motherland”).5 It is unclear, however, how many of 
the latter were soldiers or civilians, just as it is unclear whether all of those 
arrested for betrayal of the motherland were accused of having helped the 
Germans.6
Research on Moscow’s politics of retribution has so far concentrated on 
how the Soviet state punished a specifi c group of people, namely Soviet citizens 
who, whether in their capacity as policemen, town mayors or village heads, 
had represented the Nazi occupation regime in the localities.7 This includes 
Mass., 2015), 8–9. In contrast, the Chinese Nationalist government charged more than 
30,000 Chinese nationals with treason in 1945–47. Approximately 15,000 of them were 
convicted; for many, the sentence was death. It is unknown how many Japanese soldiers 
and Chinese nationals were tried by the Chinese communists. Kushner, Men to Devils, 
Devils to Men, 120. In Europe, Allied prosecution was focused on Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, on Austria. The United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union together 
convicted 8,812 German and Austrian nationals in occupation courts on German soil. Nor-
bert Frei, “Nach der Tat. Die Ahndung deutscher Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in Europe—
eine Bilanz,” in Norbert Frei, ed., Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der Umgang mit 
deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 2006), 
7–36, here 31–32. Among the European countries, perhaps no other prosecuted as many 
of its own nationals as Czechoslovakia: more than 168,000 people were tried, of whom 
approximately 69,000 were convicted. A signifi cant part of these belonged to the German 
minority (or was deemed by the state as belonging to it). Benjamin Frommer, National 
Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge, 
Eng., 2005), 2–3, 321. On Russia: Vanessa Voisin, L`URSS contre ses traîtres. L É`puration 
soviétique (1941–1955) (Paris, 2015).
3. Andreas Hilger, Ute Schmidt, and Günther Wagenlehner, “Einleitung,” in Andreas 
Hilger, Ute Schmidt, and Günther Wagenlehner, eds., Sowjetische Militärtribunale. Band 1: 
Die Verurteilung deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1941–1953 (Köln, 2001), 7–21, here 11–15.
4. On Japanese soldiers: V.A. Gavrilov and E.L. Katasonova, eds., Iaponskie voen-
noplennye v SSSR: 1945–1956 (Moscow, 2013), 17. The number of prosecuted non-German 
European Axis soldiers is my own estimate.
5. Both predatel s΄tvo and izmena translate as treason or betrayal. A ‘traitor’ was 
therefore a predatel΄ or an izmennik. Predatel’stvo and izmena were used interchange-
ably in Soviet documents. The legal category for treason, however, was izmena rodine, 
meaning regardless of whether someone was accused of predatel s΄tvo or izmena rodine, 
he or she would formally always have been prosecuted for treason, izmena rodine, under 
article 58 of the Soviet Russian penal code (or its corresponding republican versions). Kol-
laboratsionist (collaborator) and kollaboratsionizm (collaboration) are recent additions to 
the Russian vocabulary.
6. Oleg Mozokhin, Pravo na repressii. Vnesudebnye polnomochiia organov gosudar-
stvennoi bezopasnosti (1918–1953) (Moscow, 2006), 353–465.
7. ‘Soviet citizens’ includes the inhabitants of regions annexed by the Soviet Union 
in 1939–40.
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608 Slavic Review
studies on the legal basis of punishment, on secret and public trials that took 
place during and aft er the war, and on the connection between the search for 
alleged traitors and the postwar re-Sovietization of territory.8 In contrast, much 
less has been written on the state’s treatment of individuals such as teachers, 
offi  ce clerks and industrial specialists who had worked in German-overseen 
institutions. Just as little has been written on the regime’s general treatment 
of the population that had lived under German rule. Among the few existing 
studies are analyses of perceptions of collaboration among Soviet offi  cials and 
private individuals.9 Work has also been done on the internal verifi cation pro-
cess of Communist Party members who stayed in occupied territory.10
What these studies share is a widespread agreement on the crucial po-
litical function that the punishment of Soviet citizens charged with treason 
fulfi lled for the regime. Serving as proof that Soviet power had fully returned, 
their prosecution was inextricably linked to the reaffi  rmation of Moscow’s au-
thority in the formerly German-occupied regions.11 Scholars disagree, how-
ever, on how ideology played out in practice. By ideology, I mean the diff erent 
ideas that, taken together, constituted the offi  cial belief system of the Com-
munist Party, a belief system that not only aspired to be internally consistent 
and all-explanatory, but that also clearly divided the world into good and evil. 
From its beginning on June 22, 1941, the Nazi-Soviet war both entrenched and 
confi rmed this Manichean outlook.12 As Stalin stressed in his radio address on 
July 3, 1941, the war with Germany was no ordinary war between two armies, 
8. Sergei Kudriashov and Vanessa Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in So-
viet Russia (1941–1945),” Cahiers du monde russe 49, no. 2 (2008): 263–95; Aleksandr E. 
Epifanov, Otvetstvennost΄ za voennye prestupleniia, sovershennye na territorii SSSR v gody 
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: 1941–1956 gg. (Volgograd, 2005); Ilya Bourtman, “ ‘Blood 
for Blood, Death for Death’: The Soviet Military Tribunal in Krasnodar, 1943,” Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies 22, no. 2 (2008): 246–65; Claire P. Kaiser, “Betraying their Moth-
erland: Soviet Military Tribunals of Izmenniki Rodiny in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
1941–1953,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 41, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 57–83; Oleksandr 
Melnyk, “Stalinist Justice as a Site of Memory: Anti-Jewish Violence in Kyiv’s Podil Dis-
trict in September 1941 through the Prism of Soviet Investigative Documents,” Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas 61, no. 2 (2013): 223–48; Tanja Penter, “Local Collaborators on 
Trial: Soviet War Crimes Trials under Stalin (1943–1953),” Cahiers du monde russe 49, no. 
2 (2008): 341–64; on Latvia: Juliette Denis, “Identifi er les ‘éléments ennemis’ en Lettonie. 
Une priorité dans le processus de resoviétisation (1942–1945),” Cahiers du monde russe 49, 
no. 2 (2008): 297–318; on Estonia: Olaf Mertelsmann and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, “Cleansing and 
Compromise: The Estonian SSR in 1944–1945,” Cahiers du monde russe 49, no. 2 (2008): 
319–40; on Ukraine: Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the 
Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, 2001), 129–90.
9. On Rostov-na-Donu: Jeff rey Jones, “ ‘Every Family Has its Freak’: Perceptions of Col-
laboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948,” Slavic Review 64, no. 4 (2005): 747–70, 
also briefl y on the Donbas: Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 352–53.
10. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 82–126.
11. Bourtman, “Blood for Blood,” 260; Denis, “Identifi er,” 297–98; Kudriashov and 
Voisin, “The Early Stages,” 287; Melnyk, “Stalinist Justice,” 244–45; Penter, “Local Col-
laborators,” 360. See also Juliette Cadiot and Tanja Penter, “Law and Justice in Wartime 
and Postwar Stalinism,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 61, 2 (2013): 161–71.
12. With Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Germany became one of the greatest enemies 
of the Soviet Union. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded on August 23, 1939, con-
founded offi  cial Soviet notions of good or evil for two years.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 609
but rather a “war of the entire Soviet people” against the Nazis, a struggle 
against enslavement in which the Soviet Union stood united with all peoples 
in Europe and America who fought “for their independence, for democratic 
liberties.”13 Consequently, Soviet wartime newspapers and novels portrayed 
Soviet citizens in occupied territory who were said to support the Germans 
as the lowest of the low, as “dirty renegades” or “petty kulak carrions.”14 The 
fi ght against them would be “ruthless,” Stalin warned, and their punishment 
strict. Those deemed traitors only deserved one fate: death.15
The question that continues to be debated in the literature is whether the 
state’s actual practice was congruent with ideology. Amir Weiner has argued 
that the returning Soviet authorities considered those accused of having 
served the Germans not “by-products of the war but eternal enemies” that war 
and occupation had helped to uncover.16 The passing of time had no eff ect on 
the state’s punishment policies. In developing his argument, Weiner provides 
examples of policemen, village heads, and Ukrainian nationalists, yet he also 
applies it to anyone accused of having helped the Germans: “The irreversibil-
ity of any form of collaboration was further underlined by the absolute denial 
of political or social rehabilitation, even in the face of a dire need for experi-
enced personnel.”17 In contrast, Jeff rey Jones, Olaf Mertelsmann, Aigi Rahi-
Tamm and Tanja Penter have argued that the Soviet regime did not always live 
up to the harsh image that it projected. In the fi rst post-Nazi occupation years, 
the authorities allowed for leniency not just in the case of industrial special-
ists, offi  ce clerks and others who had been employed in German-overseen in-
stitutions but also, as Mertelsmann and Rahi-Tamm suggested, in the case 
of some village heads. The “degree of tolerance” that the regime displayed 
toward some deemed to have helped the Germans mostly resulted from the 
lack of qualifi ed personnel. It also, as Jones suggested, might have refl ected 
local party leaders’ understanding for the moral gray zones of occupation.18
In this article, I argue that both positions raise crucial points, but that 
framing the debate solely as one of ideology versus pragmatism does not fully 
capture the nature of Moscow’s politics of retribution. As the Red Army recon-
quered more and more territory from the Germans, retribution evolved into a 
process in which diff erent objectives and interests had to be weighed against 
each other, which in turn explains why punishment became less indiscrimi-
nate and less strict aft er the winter of 1943/44. This balancing act, however, 
was not free of contradictions. Although the Soviet authorities insisted that 
the war had been a moral test that did not allow for pragmatic choices, they 
were not only willing to accommodate their own pragmatic decisions, but also 
did not hold everyone accused of treason accountable to the same standard. 
13. Joseph Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: Speeches, Orders of 
the Day, and Answers to Foreign Press Correspondents (Moscow, 1944), 13–14, quote 14.
14. Karel C. Berkhoff , Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II 
(Cambridge; Mass., 2012), 234–40.
15. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War, 12–13, quote 12.
16. Weiner, Making Sense, 136–37, quote 136.
17. Quoted from Weiner, Making Sense, 183.
18. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 353; Mertelsmann and Rahi-Tamm, “Cleansing and 
Compromise,” 322, 339; Jones, “ ‘Every Family Has its Freak,’ ” 753–56, quote 756.
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610 Slavic Review
These inconsistent practices refl ected tensions between ideology and pragma-
tism, but that alone does not suffi  ce as an explanation. They also arose from 
tensions within ideology, namely the belief that the war had uncovered mass 
enemies in hiding, and the belief that it had been won with the mass sup-
port of the Soviet population in occupied territory. In other words, ideologi-
cal convictions not only co-existed with pragmatic needs that ran counter to 
these convictions, Soviet ideology was itself also confl icted. The Soviet state 
that emerged from the war, then, was both powerful and insecure, able to 
quickly rebuild its authority in the formerly German-occupied territories, but 
also deeply ambivalent about the politics of retribution that it pursued.
Soviet Legal Documents as Historical Sources
This article draws in large part on state documents that were for internal use 
only (party, procuracy and secret police reports including trial records), and 
state documents such as newspapers that were specifi cally produced for the 
public. My aim is not to determine whether the allegations that the state lev-
eled against those it deemed traitors or German accomplices were true. Some, 
maybe even many of the convicted, had probably committed all, some, or 
similar acts that they were accused of. This had included taking part in the 
Holocaust, looting of property, usually accompanied by violence and rape, 
rounding up people for forced labor in Germany, or participating in German 
punitive raids. However, the Soviet justice system lacked basic standards of 
due process (such as independent judges and defense attorneys) that form the 
precondition for any trial to be considered as impartial as possible. Conse-
quently, Soviet treason trials did not fulfi ll the criteria necessary to establish 
beyond doubt the criminal responsibility of the individual. Soviet legal docu-
ments relating to these trials therefore have to be treated with considerable 
caution.19 At the same time, it is important to distinguish between document 
types. If cross-checked with other sources, in this case records of the German 
occupation regime and partisan units, protocols of pre-trial interrogations 
can provide information on what lawyers would call facts, for example in 
which German police unit a Soviet citizen had served and what that unit’s re-
sponsibility was. However, as the pre-trial investigations were conducted by 
the Soviet secret police, which routinely applied torture during its question-
ing, people usually confessed to the charges. Confessions, in turn, were then 
considered suffi  cient proof of guilt. Any self-accusatory statements by the ac-
cused or statements regarding their motives made during the interrogations 
thus cannot be treated as reliable historical sources. (Correspondingly, a rule 
of law-based legal system would dismiss statements that were made under 
19. Scholars disagree over the usefulness of these documents. For a more positive 
assessment: Penter, “Local Collaborators” (on trials of Soviet citizens), 361–63; and Alex-
ander Victor Prusin, “ ‘Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!’: The Holocaust and Soviet War 
Crimes Trials, December 1945–February 1946,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17, no. 1 
(2003): 1–30 (on trials of German soldiers). For a critique of Prusin: Manfred Zeidler, “Der 
Minsker Kriegsverbrecherprozeß vom Januar 1946. Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem so-
wjetischen Schauprozeß gegen deutsche Kriegsgefangene,” Vierteljahresheft e für Zeitge-
schichte 52, no. 2 (2004): 211–44.
https://doi.org/10.5612/slavicreview
.75.3.0606
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . Pendlebury Library of M
usic , on 01 Sep 2017 at 12:00:23 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 611
torture as legally irrelevant). Witness testimonies, on the other hand, were 
not more or less reliable than witness testimonies made at trials that adhered 
to due process. Yet even here, a note of caution is necessary. The indictments 
prepared for public trials of those deemed traitors and German accomplices 
drew heavily on material by the Extraordinary State Commission (Chrezvy-
chainaia gosudarstvennaia komissiia, ChGK), created by Moscow in Novem-
ber 1942 with the aim to investigate German war crimes. In some cases, the 
Soviet authorities falsifi ed ChGK reports to cover up Soviet prewar killings, 
the demolition of religious or cultural monuments, and (possibly) the deliber-
ate destruction of industry during the Red Army’s retreat in the summer of 
1941. Moscow also used fabricated ChGK material to claim that the Germans 
had carried out the Soviet secret police’s murder of Polish offi  cers at Katyn 
in 1940.20 Knowing of these falsifi cations does not necessarily diminish the 
value that the thousand of witness testimonies, collected by local ChGK com-
missions throughout the formerly German-occupied regions, have for histo-
rians. Nevertheless, as the secret police controlled and supervised the local 
ChGK commissions, its offi  cers also oft en recorded the testimonies. Locals 
knew this, as they could recognize the secret police by its uniform, and their 
understanding or expectation of what was permissible to say could have af-
fected their statements.
Soviet trial records and interrogation protocols, then, cannot provide 
evidence of the accused’s acts and motivations. What they—as well as secret 
police, party and military procuracy reports relating to the prosecution of So-
viet citizens—do attest to, however, are regime policies and practices, and the 
ways in which these changed over time. In order to give equal weight to the 
voices of non-state actors, this article also draws on memoirs, shorter recol-
lections, and complaint letters to the authorities. Juxtaposing them with state 
documents makes the similarities and diff erences in human perception and 
judgment visible.
“Liquidating the Consequences of Enemy Invasion”
One night in July 1944, a man in a military uniform knocked on the door of 
an apartment in Minsk where eighteen-year-old Vladimir Svetlov was living 
with his parents. He took Svetlov away to a half-destroyed building some-
where in the Belorussian capital, where the boy spent the night in a make-
shift  prison cell. The next morning, Svetlov was greeted by secret police of-
fi cer Onuchkin: “You didn’t think that Soviet rule would return? Well now 
you see, we have returned.”21 Svetlov was accused of counterrevolutionary 
activity, which had consisted of keeping an anti-Soviet  nationalist leafl et at 
home. During his interrogation, the NKVD  offi  cer told him: “You here are all 
20. Marina Sorokina, “People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation 
of Nazi Crimes in the USSR,” Kritika 6, no. 4 (2005): 797–831, here 804–6. For a critical as-
sessment of the veracity of ChGK documents (here on Estonia) see also Mertelsmann and 
Rahi-Tamm, “Cleansing and Compromise,” 335.
21. Quoted from Vladimir Svetlov, “ ‘Osvobozhdennyi΄ Minsk 1944 goda,” in Igor΄ N. 
Kuznetsov and Iakov Basin, eds., Repressivnaia politika sovetskoi vlasti v Belarusi. Sbornik 
nauchnykh rabot, vol. 2 (Minsk, 2007), 333–45, here 335.
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612 Slavic Review
soaked in fascist stench. . . . I, however, gave my blood for the motherland, I 
was twice wounded, I attacked. And now I have to deal with these diff erent 
kinds of shit.”22 For offi  cers like Onuchkin, the task was clear: to “liquidate the 
consequences of enemy invasion” by fi nding the “enemies of Soviet power” 
(vragi sovetskoi vlasti) and “servants of the Germans” (prisluzhniki nemtsev) 
who had remained in the recently reconquered Soviet territories.23 Of all insti-
tutions, it was the secret police (NKVD and NKGB, in 1946 renamed into MVD 
and MGB) whose responsibility it was to investigate what Soviet citizens had 
done. Some information had already been collected during the war, yet much 
more still needed to be gathered, not to mention tracking down suspects. As 
the Front rolled westwards over formerly occupied territory, secret police units 
within the Red Army also took part. In that process, the secret police could 
draw on a variety of sources, ranging from partisan units, informer networks 
and interrogations to captured German documents and complaint letters by 
Soviet citizens.24 Material and witness statements collected by the Extraordi-
nary State Commission (ChGK) provided another important source.25 Prewar 
surveillance and policing tools, namely the passport and registration card 
catalogue and the smaller crime surveillance catalogue, were also utilized.26
In the eyes of the Soviet regime, the most conspicuous “servants of the 
Germans” were people who had served in the German-organized police forces 
in occupied territory. In regions under German civilian control, these police 
forces were called Schutzmannschaft en, in regions under German military 
control, Ordnungsdienst.27 By the end of 1942, the Schutzmannschaft en had 
expanded to roughly 300,000 men. The Ordnungsdienst probably comprised 
roughly the same amount of men, given that the territory under military con-
trol was about the same size as that under civilian control.28 As responsibili-
ties of the Schutzmannschaft en and Ordnungsdienst were the same, I refer to 
both simply as the local police; inhabitants of the occupied territories usually 
22. Quoted from Svetlov, “ ‘Osvobozhdennyi’ Minsk,” 335, 343.
23. These were the words of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, First Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of Belorussia and during the war head of the Soviet partisan movement, in 
front of the Belorussian Komsomol on June 20, 1944. National’nyi arkhiv Respubliki Be-
larus’ (hereaft er NARB) f. 1440, op. 3, d. 523, l. 77 (Ponomarenko’s speeches and articles, 
1944–47, 1950).
24. Amir Weiner and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, “Getting to Know You: The Soviet Surveillance 
System, 1939–57,” Kritika 13, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 5–45, here 23–33. For interrogations as a 
means of extracting information, see the case of Valentin Rusak, during the German oc-
cupation mayor of Baranovichi, west Belorussia: NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 614, l. 1. (Valentin 
Matveevich Rusak’s fi le). On the postwar rebuilding and utilization of informer networks 
(agentura) in Belorussia: NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 400, ll. 314–30, here l. 315 (NKGB and 
NKVD special reports). Also in general: Jeff rey Burds, Sovetskaia agentura. Ocherki istorii 
SSSR v poslevoennye gody (1944–1948) (Moscow, New York, 2006), 41, table 1.
25. Weiner and Rahi-Tamm, “Getting to Know You,” 29–30.
26. On the development of a surveillance system in the 1920s and 1930s: David R. 
Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–
1953 (New Haven, 2009), 158–80. On the use to which the secret police put it in their search 
for traitors: Epifanov, Otvetstvennost ,΄ 73.
27. Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschaft s- und Vernichtungs-
politik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 1999), 199 (fn. 428), 202, 204–9.
28. On the Schutzmannschaft en: Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes 
of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44 (New York, 2000), 60.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 613
called them politsai, from the German word Polizei, police. Subordinated to 
higher German police or military organs, the local police was staff ed with So-
viet citizens and fulfi lled much of the ‘leg work’ of the occupation regime, in 
particular in the countryside where German presence, apart from large-scale 
punitive campaigns, was scarce.29
Policemen, however, were not the only ones who had eff ectively repre-
sented the Nazi regime in the localities. Throughout the occupied regions, 
the Germans by and large kept the organizational structure of the Soviet ad-
ministration’s lower levels (raion and below) intact. Due to personnel short-
ages, they depended heavily on the employment of locals. In each conquered 
region, Soviet citizens were appointed as town and district mayors and heads 
of villages.30 It is diffi  cult to estimate how many locals held these low-level 
representative posts, by which I only mean policemen, mayors and village 
heads. On the territory that would constitute Belorussia aft er 1944, an esti-
mated 80,000 to 90,000 people occupied such positions during the war, about 
one percent of the prewar population of that territory.31 Applying this ratio 
to the estimated sixty million Soviet citizens who lived under German rule, 
one arrives at a number of 600,000 locals who throughout the Soviet western 
territories represented the Nazi regime in the localities.32 However, consider-
ing that 600,000 Soviet citizens alone served in the local police forces in oc-
cupied territory, the total number must have been higher, probably closer to 
one million.
In regions where Soviet partisans were active during the war, the men 
dealt in their own ways with individuals considered traitors. This usually 
meant shooting them together with their families, thus employing collective 
punishment.33 Once Soviet authority returned in full force, however, the state 
reclaimed its monopoly on violence. Those who had worked as policemen, 
29. Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 60, 72.
30. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 196–202; Markus Eikel and Valentina Sivaieva, “City 
Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine, 1941–4: How Local Administrators 
Co-operated with the German Occupation Authorities,” Contemporary European History 
23, no. 3 (2014): 405–28, here 408, 411–13.
31. This is my estimate drawing on Gerlach’s calculations. 50,000–60,000 Soviet citi-
zens were policemen, 20,000 village heads, and an unknown number of town and district 
mayors. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 199 (fn. 428), 202, 204–9. By early 1941, Belorussia had 
a population of 10 million, of which one million lived in those parts of Białystok/Belostok 
district that were handed back to Poland in 1944, and nine million in the territories that 
would constitute post–1944 Belorussia. These are my own calculations, based on the 1937 
Soviet census (and not on the manipulated 1939 one). See source No. 1 in V.S. Kozhurin, 
“O chislennosti naseleniia SSSR nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (neizvestnye 
dokumenty),” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal no. 2 (1991): 21–26, here 25. On the 1937 cen-
sus: A.G. Volkov, “Perepis’ naseleniia 1937 goda. Vymysly i pravda,” in Perepis’ naseleniia 
SSSR 1937 goda. Istoriia i materialy (Moscow, 1990), volume 3–5, part II, 6–63.
32. This does not include the hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens who fought 
as military auxiliaries in the Wehrmacht or SS. For the population size under German 
rule: Babette Quinkert, “Einleitung,” in Babette Quinkert and Jörg Morré, eds., Deutsche 
Besatzung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944. Vernichtungskrieg, Reaktionen, Erinnerung 
 (Pader born, 2014), 11–23, here 11.
33. Bogdan Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen 1941–1944. Mythos und Wirklichkeit (Pa-
derborn, 2009), 255–61, 314, 321–22; Masha Cerovic, “ ‘Au chien, une mort de chien.’ Les 
partisans face aux ‘traîtres à la Patrie,’ ” Cahier du monde russe 49, no. 2 (2008): 239–62.
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mayors, or village heads were usually charged with treason (izmena rodine), 
which fell under the category of counterrevolutionary crimes. In trying its citi-
zens for treason instead of, perhaps, complicity in murder or criminal assault, 
the Soviet Union did not diff er from other contemporary post-occupation 
states, whether in Europe or Asia.34 In the penal code, treason was defi ned as 
“acts committed by citizens of the Soviet Union to the detriment of the mili-
tary might of the Soviet Union, to the independence of her state or the integrity 
of her territory.”35 It did not matter if the accused had held Soviet citizenship 
prior to 1939 or if they had only become Soviet citizens in 1939–40, as a result 
of territorial annexations: the legal system made no distinction between these 
two groups.
In the Soviet Union, counterrevolutionary crimes in general and treason 
in particular were prosecuted by military courts, which consisted of three 
judges, or of one judge and two assessors.36 Military trials were to be open to 
the public, and a prosecutor (prokurator) and defense attorney had to be pres-
ent, but in practice, trials were usually conducted in secret and in the absence 
of both prosecutor and defense attorney. The secret police carried out the pre-
trial investigations, although the prosecutor, who at once fulfi lled prosecut-
ing, investigative and protesting functions, could also be involved.37
Of all counterrevolutionary crimes, treason constituted, in the words of 
contemporary leading Soviet lawyers, “the gravest and most heinous off ence” 
during World War II.38 It was tried under Articles 58–1a (for civilians) and 
58–1b (for soldiers) if the military court applied the penal code of Soviet Rus-
sia. If the penal codes of other Soviet republics were applied, treason was tried 
under diff erent articles, yet given that the texts were identical, it did not mat-
ter which one was used.39 Treason carried the death sentence for civilians and 
soldiers, but if the military court could determine “mitigating circumstances” 
in the case of civilians, it could lower their sentence to ten years hard labor.40 
It was also possible to be sentenced for minor counterrevolutionary activity, 
which the penal code defi ned as “relations” with a “foreign state.” Depending 
on the individual case, it was punished with as little as three years hard labor, 
but could also result in summary execution.41
For the Soviet authorities, two problems soon arose. For one, the existing 
34. On east Asia: Kushner, Men to Devils, Devils to Men, 120; Lawson, “Wartime Atroc-
ities,” 1–9, 33–49. On Europe: Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New 
York, 2005), 44–50; Kudriashov and Voisin, “Early Stages,” 268–69.
35. Quoted from Aron Trainin et al., eds., Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR. Kommentarii (Mos-
cow, 1944), 64; Ugolovnyi kodeks Belorusskoi SSR (Moscow, 1944), 12. For the legal basis of 
postwar punishment: Kudriashov and Voisin, “Early Stages.”
36. On the fusion of civil and military authority in Soviet law: Harold J. Berman and 
Miroslav Kerner, Soviet Military Law and Administration (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), 64–65, 
101–2, 109–10, 133–34.
37. Berman and Kerner, Soviet Military Law, 110–24, 163.
38. Quoted from Trainin et al., Ugolovnyi kodeks, 65.
39. In the case of Belorussia, treason was tried under articles 63–1 (for civilians) and 
63–2 (for soldiers). See the respective penal codes on counterrevolutionary crimes: Trainin 
et al., Ugolovnyi kodeks, 64–77; Ugolovnyi kodeks Belorusskoi SSR, 12–4.
40. Trainin et al., Ugolovnyi kodeks, 64; Ugolovnyi kodeks Belorusskoi SSR, 12.
41. Trainin et al., Ugolovnyi kodeks, 67; Ugolovnyi kodeks Belorusskoi SSR, 20.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 615
law on treason was not very detailed. Not only was it unclear what was to count 
as mitigating circumstances, but the nature of the crime itself was also only 
vaguely defi ned in the text. In consequence, a person who worked as a cook 
for the Germans could be judged under the same article as a policeman, which 
is also what happened in practice.42 Secondly, and as evidenced by such cases, 
it was not clear just who exactly had been “servants of the Germans.” In the 
eyes of the authorities, those who had held representative posts in the occupa-
tion regime certainly could be described as such. However, as Soviet offi  cials 
discovered early in the war, local involvement with the Germans was much 
more widespread and complex than the case of policemen, town mayors, and 
village heads suggested. Indeed, for Soviet citizens in occupied territory, it 
was impossible not to come in contact with the German regime, whatever form 
that contact took. What to make, for example, of Soviet citizens who worked 
as offi  ce clerks in the district and town administrations, which included 
departments such as housing, health, fi nances and education, and who, in 
various ways, willingly or unwillingly, became entangled and complicit in 
German policies?43 And what about those whose work brought them in close 
contact with the Germans, for example translators or newspaper editors, not 
to mention the many more who, like teachers or engineers, were employed in 
German-overseen institutions? In their reports, secret police and party mem-
bers oft en spoke of people who “worked under the Germans” (rabotali u 
nemtsev), but there was no agreement on who was to fall into that category.44 
“Working under the Germans” could be understood in a narrow sense, and 
only refer to policemen, town mayors and village heads. It could also, how-
ever, be understood in a broader sense and include everyone who had con-
tinued to work in his or her profession under the Germans. In their search for 
“servants of the Germans,” then, the returning Soviet authorities also sought 
to determine just what precisely working for the occupiers had entailed.
Prosecution for treason began in late 1941, aft er the Red Army, in its fi rst 
counteroff ensive, regained territories in western Russia. In this early recon-
quest phase, punishment was particularly strict, as the example of Kalinin 
province shows: half of the defendants charged with treason were sentenced 
to death. Among them was a woman who had worked as a cleaning lady 
for the German commander. Moscow soon grew alarmed by military tribu-
nal reports that stressed the NKVD’s improper qualifi cation of crimes, and 
moved to clarify the legal basis of retribution.45 Several directives were issued 
throughout 1942 and 1943, including an April 19, 1943 decree by the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR. This decree (ukaz) provided the foundation for the Soviet 
prosecution of German and other Axis soldiers, but it also applied to Soviet 
citizens accused of serving the Germans. The decree introduced a distinction 
42. Kudriashov and Voisin, “Early Stages,” 272.
43. The staff  of local administrations, for example, compiled lists of Jewish residents, 
oversaw the distribution and sale of Jewish property, and were involved in the administra-
tion of ghettos. Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders,” 417–24; 
Jones, “ ‘Every Family Has its Freak,’ ” 753.
44. Rabotali u nemtsev can also be translated as “working for the Germans” or “work-
ing with the Germans.”
45. Kudriashov and Voisin, “Early Stages,” 281–83.
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between ‘traitors’ (izmenniki, also izmenniki rodiny) and ‘accomplices’ (po-
sobniki). Traitors were Soviet citizens guilty of murder and mistreatment of 
Soviet prisoners of war and civilians; they should receive the death sentence. 
Soviet citizens considered accomplices to these acts were to receive a forced 
labor camp sentence between 15 and 20 years.46
The April 1943 decree, however, appears to have had only limited eff ect 
on practice, as can be deduced from a Supreme Court instruction issued in 
November 1943. In this document, the Supreme Court criticized the practice of 
military tribunals of classifying every action of Soviet citizens deemed to have 
served the Germans as treason.47 It therefore saw the need to further specify 
who traitors were: Soviet citizens who had worked for the Germans in leading 
positions in the local administration or police; those who had denounced par-
tisans, soldiers or communists to the Germans; those who had participated 
in the murder of, as well as violence against, the local population; those who 
had taken part in the robbery of private and/or state property; and those who 
had served as soldiers in the German army. Traitors were to be shot. Accom-
plices who had actively helped the Germans with the reconstruction of indus-
tries, transport and agriculture, and with collecting goods for the Wehrmacht 
were to be sentenced to 15–20 years hard labor.48 If civilians, then traitors 
and accomplices were to be tried under article 58–1a (or its corresponding re-
publican versions) or under the April 1943 decree. Two groups were to remain 
unprosecuted: Soviet citizens who had “been employed in administrative 
positions” under the Germans but who had supported partisans or who had 
committed sabotage, and minor employees of the administration including 
teachers, engineers or agricultural specialists, as long as they had not com-
mitted any crimes.49
The November 1943 instruction, it seems, was the most detailed one ever 
issued by Moscow, refl ecting a move toward systematization and clarifi cation. 
The real turning point in the state’s politics of retribution, however, occurred 
in the winter of 1943/44. By that time, the Red Army had pushed the Germans 
from western Russia and parts of Ukraine and Belorussia; Soviet forces would 
reclaim all of Ukraine, Belorussia, and most of the Baltic countries before 
summer 1944. During those fi rst months of 1944, a noticeable change took 
place: punishment became less strict. As reports by NKVD military tribunals 
operating in Belorussia show, during these fi rst post-occupation weeks and 
months, the death penalty was much less common than one might have ex-
pected. Of the 360 civilians who in May and June 1944 were tried under the 
treason article 58–1a (or 63–1), for example, nine percent received the death 
46. For the text of the April 19, 1943 decree: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii arkhiv 
sotsial΄no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) f. 17, op. 3, d. 1047, ll. 34, 232–33 (Politburo ses-
sions 16 March–20 June 1943, protocol No. 40). On its origin: Andreas Hilger, Nikita Pet-
rov and Günther Wagenlehner, “Der ‘Ukaz 43’: Entstehung und Problematik des Dekrets 
des Präsidiums des Obersten Sowjets vom 19. April 1943,” in Sowjetische Militärtribunale. 
Band 1, 177–209, here 184–85.
47. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 349; G. Z. Anashkin, Otvetstvennost΄ za izmenu ro-
dine i spionazh (Moscow, 1964), 43.
48. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 349–50; Anashkin, Otvetstvennost ,΄ 43–44.
49. Quoted from Anashkin, Otvetstvennost ,΄ 44.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 617
penalty, while the rest were sentenced to hard labor. Of the 134 people tried 
under the April 1943 decree, all received hard labor sentences.50 The ratio of 
death penalty to prison sentence dropped further in the next two years:  of 
the 3,134 people convicted of treason in Belorussia during the second half 
of 1946, for example, only four percent were given the death penalty, while 
the rest received hard labor sentences, the majority of them ten years in the 
Gulag.51 A similar trend—that labor camp sentences were more common than 
the death penalty—was also observed in the fi rst post-occupation months and 
years in Ukraine.52
One might think that this development was the result of a learning pro-
cess, in other words, that the Soviet judiciary now drew a neat distinction 
between traitors, who received the death penalty, and accomplices, who re-
ceived forced labor sentences. Yet, although punishment did become less in-
discriminate, probably in response to Moscow’s November 1943 instruction, 
this explanation does not suffi  ce to explain the moderation of punitive poli-
cies. Among the inhabitants of Belorussia sentenced to forced labor were for-
mer policemen, alleged spies, and village heads who were said to have killed 
or mistreated Soviet citizens, reported partisans to the Germans, or stolen 
property. According to the April 1943 decree and the November 1943 instruc-
tion, these individuals should have been categorized as traitors and thus re-
ceived the death sentence. By far not all of them did, however.53 How can that 
be explained?
While military courts certainly had some leeway in their decisions, it is 
inconceivable that they simply disobeyed Moscow’s instructions. Even if the 
center combined proactive with retroactive actions, Stalin and the Politburo 
set the general policy, and the courts adhered to it. This can clearly be seen 
in later developments. In May 1947, probably with an eye to its international 
image, the Soviet state abolished the death penalty.54 As if to compensate, 
the Ministry of Justice soon criticized the military courts operating in the 
formerly occupied regions for being too lenient with alleged traitors.55 Of the 
1,211 people who had been convicted of treason in Belorussia during the fi rst 
half of 1947, about 61 percent received a 10-year sentence, while only about 
seven percent received a 25-year sentence.56 In response to Moscow’s criti-
cism, the military courts quickly began to hand out stricter sentences. Of the 
1,589 people who were convicted of treason in Belorussia during the second 
half of 1948, about 83 percent received a 25-year sentence, while only about 
50. NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 22, l. 35 (special reports from the NKVD, NKGB and the NKVD 
military tribunals in Belorussia).
51. NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 600, ll. 233–34 (special reports from the procuracy of Belo-
russia, the military prosecutor, and the military tribunals).
52. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 356.
53. See the 1944 and 1946 reports of the NKVD/MVD military tribunals operating in 
Belorussia: NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 22, ll. 32–40; NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 600, 233–34.
54. On the abolishment of the death penalty: Berman and Kerner, Soviet Military Law, 
89–90.
55. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 355.
56. NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 688, l. 155 (documents from the military prosecutors and 
military tribunals).
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15 percent received a 10-year sentence.57 In January 1950, the death penalty 
was reinstated for alleged traitors, spies, and saboteurs.58 Because a statute 
of limitation did not exist for treason, the state tried people for their wartime 
activities all the way into the late 1980s.59
The moderation of punishment aft er the winter of 1943/44 should also 
not be understood as an increase in the due process of law. The Soviet legal 
system continued to lack the conditions necessary to establish the criminal 
responsibility of the individual. When people were sentenced in secret (as the 
majority were), their trials were usually quick, conducted within hours. At 
public military trials, the authorities were careful to project an image of legal-
ity, which included the presence of witnesses and defense attorneys.60 Yet, as 
the Soviet criminal justice system considered confessions suffi  cient proof of 
guilt, and because torture applied during the pre-trial investigations usually 
led people to admit to the charges, the accused’s guilt had typically already 
been established prior to the trials. The only question remaining was what 
sentence they should receive.61
The most plausible explanation for the moderation of punishment, then, 
is that as the Red Army reconquered more and more territory, Moscow’s poli-
tics of retribution increasingly came to be shaped by considerations about the 
postwar period that went beyond the need to demonstrate power and reclaim 
authority. The shortage of experienced personnel certainly played a role, as 
the example of teachers will show, but so did, I would suggest, the regime’s 
self-image. Aft er all, the Soviets saw themselves as liberators even in the ter-
ritories that had only been annexed in 1939/40. While it was still important 
to mete out punishment, the government deemed it suffi  cient by 1944 to send 
most of those convicted for treason to the Gulag, and not to the gallows. Had 
the secret police proceeded according to the 1943 April decree and the Novem-
ber 1943 instruction, then the number of executions in Belorussia would have 
been higher than the number of executions during the Great Terror 1936–38, 
when an estimated 30,000 inhabitants of the republic were killed.62 Executing 
57. NARB f. 4p, op. 62, d. 43, l. 395 (special reports from the military prosecutors and 
military tribunals).
58. Berman and Kerner, Soviet Military Law, 89–90.
59. Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 342.
60. The majority of public trials took place right aft er the Red Army had reconquered 
a region, but some later trials were also open for local audiences to attend. In Belorussia, 
for example, at least fi ve trials that took place from April to June 1944 in Gomel ,΄ Mogilëv, 
and eastern Polesia region were public. NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 22, l. 34. In the fi rst half of 
1946, probably at least three trials in Minsk region were public. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
Minskoi oblasti (GAMO) f. 1p, op. 2, d. 143, ll. 137–40, 143–53, 167–74, 264–71 (NKGB, NKVD, 
police and procuracy reports, Minsk region).
61. On lack of witnesses and torture as acknowledged in secret police reports: NARB 
f. 4p, op. 29, d. 22, ll. 35–7; NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 600, ll. 64, 227–32; also Svetlov, “ ‘Osvo-
bozhdennyi’ Minsk,” 340–41. On confessions as suffi  cient proof of guilt: Berman and 
Kerner, Soviet Military Law, 111–12.
62. These are my own calculations (taking into account that the overall percentage 
of death sentences to Gulag sentences was roughly equal during the Great Terror), based 
on source No. 66 in V. Danilov et al., eds., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i 
raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939. Tom 5, kniga 2: 1938–1939 
(Moscow, 2006), 156–64, here 161.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 619
every village head in the formerly occupied western regions could have had 
a severely destabilizing eff ect on local communities, turning people against 
the Soviet authorities, which would have made it more diffi  cult to portray the 
regime as a guarantor of justice and rightful punishment.
Moral Choices, Pragmatic Choices
This balancing of diff erent objectives and interests, however, was not free 
from contradictions. Moscow continued to insist that the war was a defi ning 
moment in time, one that revealed people’s true loyalties.63 Consequently, the 
returning Soviet authorities did not show any understanding for the moral 
gray zones of occupation. Combined with an analysis of procuracy reports, 
the letters that individuals deemed ‘German servants’ wrote to the authorities 
demonstrate this well.
In March 1946, a man by the name of V. Mikhodievskii wrote to the Su-
preme Soviet of the USSR. Born in Minsk in 1912, Mikhodievskii had worked 
as a German-language teacher before the war. During Nazi rule, the German 
labor offi  ce ordered him to work either as a teacher or translator. “To work 
as a teacher meant raising children in the spirit of fascism,” he wrote, which 
is why he chose to be a translator in the industry section of the Minsk city 
administration.64 When the Soviets returned, he was sentenced to forced la-
bor in a brick-making plant in Bobruisk, east Belorussia. As Mikhodievskii 
wrote: “I work here together with former policemen and their family mem-
bers, a group of people that I can neither be compared to with regards to my 
activities under the Germans nor with regards to my moral qualities. . . . The 
country needs specialists. The schools need teachers. . . . Aft er all, I have the 
knowledge and the abilities and the strong desire to be of as much use as pos-
sible to my country.”65 In his letter, Mikhodievskii raised an important issue: 
given the conditions of the German occupation, just how should people have 
behaved? In other words, what constituted guilt? Mikhodievskii maintained 
that it had been possible to work in ‘regular,’ minor jobs (here as a translator 
within the city administration), but not to work for the Germans in the way 
that a policeman (or in this case, a teacher) had done. According to him, a 
clear diff erence existed between individuals like himself, who in his mind 
had remained morally untainted, and other locals like policemen and their 
families, who in his mind had morally implicated themselves. In doing so, 
Mikhodievskii essentially argued that because of the constraints imposed by 
the Germans, people in occupied territory could not choose not to work for the 
Germans. Yet, just what working for the Germans meant diff ered from person 
to person. Some made the choice to support them: these were the policemen, 
but also people in administrative posts who actively and willingly imple-
mented German policies. Others, according to Mikhodievskii, merely fulfi lled 
63. Weiner, Making Sense, 8, 10, 135; Jones, “ ‘Every Family Has its Freak,’ ” 753.
64. Quoted from V. Mikhodievskii’s letter: Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii (GARF) f. 7523, op. 31, d. 160, l. 57 (petitions by repatriates and those who lived under 
occupation).
65. Quoted from GARF f. 7523, op. 31, d. 160, l. 57.
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their jobs without harboring any political sympathies for the Germans. Put 
another way, it was impossible to say ‘no,’ but a ‘yes’ carried radically diff er-
ent implications—you could become morally implicated or you could remain 
morally untainted.
In his reasoning, then, Mikhodievskii asked the authorities to take into 
account the circumstances under which he had come to work as a translator. 
As his letter did not contain follow-up information, I do not know what hap-
pened to him, but I doubt that his plea was successful. In my analysis of the 
reports that military prosecutors and the main prosecutor of Belorussia wrote 
on the work of the military tribunals from 1944 to 1950, and in particular on 
the verdicts under review, I did not come across one single case where such 
external constraints, pressures or factors were taken into consideration. In 
other words, the Soviet judiciary did not take into account the circumstances 
under which people came to be employed by the Germans. Soviet citizens 
should have refused to enter German service and gone to the forests to fi ght 
with the partisans, even if most partisan units only began to exist much later 
into the war. For the Soviet authorities, people like Mikhodievskii had made a 
moral, and not a pragmatic choice.
At the same time, the wartime Soviet state was willing, indeed eager, to 
coopt into its ranks those whom it considered the worst traitors. These indi-
viduals were what one could call ‘traitors-turned-partisans,’ that is, Soviet 
citizens who had served in the German-organized local police forces (or in 
other German institutions), but eventually defected and joined the Soviet par-
tisans. Encouraging them to come over to the Soviet side was a deliberate 
policy, actively promoted by Panteleimon Ponomarenko, head of the Soviet 
partisan movement from 1942 to 1944 and First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Belorussia from 1938 to 1947. By the early fall of 1942, this policy had 
found Stalin’s approval.66 Commanders were instructed to infi ltrate police 
units with informers that could organize the defection of policemen to the 
partisans.67 According to a July 1943 directive, the aim was to “propagandize 
broadly” that every return to the Soviet side “has the full possibility to merit 
the pardon of the Soviet people.”68
To be sure, the secret police instructed its operational units to interro-
gate defectors aft er their arrival in the units and to thoroughly check their 
“former treacherous activity,” at times sentencing them to death.69 Changing 
sides, then, was a dangerous task, and few did it in 1942. Throughout 1943, 
however, the number of defectors grew. The tide had turned: by now it was 
clear that the Soviet Union would win the war. In September 1943, Lavren-
66. On Ponomarenko’s crucial role: Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet Parti-
sans in World War II (Lawrence, 2006), 43–44, 47, 225–27.
67. Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen, 265–66. On the NKVD informers’ eff orts in Gomel΄ 
and Polesia district who prepared the defection of policemen to the Soviet side in August 
1943, and on policemen and soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army that joined the par-
tisans in Mogilëv region in September 1943 see also NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 400, ll. 98–9, 
154 (NKGB and NKVD special reports).
68. Quoted in Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 221.
69. Quoted from NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 400, ll. 151–52. On death sentences: Musial, 
Sowjetische Partisanen, 268–69.
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tii Tsanava, head of the NKGB in Belorussia and also deputy to the head of 
the Soviet partisan movement (Ponomarenko), remarked on the panic that 
reigned in a police garrison in Bobruisk: “Large-scale defections to the parti-
san side were reported.” Some even tried to bribe the Soviet agents in charge 
of organization: “Individual people who wish to come over to our side pay 
large sums of money to the mediator and middlemen, sometimes even hand 
them gold.”70
By the time the Soviet partisan movement was disbanded in the summer 
of 1944, ‘traitors-turned-partisans’ were not a marginal phenomenon. Accord-
ing to offi  cial Soviet sources compiled in 1946, 281,007 partisans had been 
active in Belorussia, the center of Soviet partisan warfare. To this number can 
be added another 79,484 individuals, probably older people, women, and/
or children who served as guards in partisan zones or fulfi lled individual 
missions. Overall, then, the partisan movement in Belorussia had comprised 
360,491 people. For about 249,653 partisans, data exists on their whereabouts 
before joining the movement. While most came directly “from their place of 
residence,” meaning local civilians not affi  liated with the occupation regime, 
almost 40,000 were former Red Army soldiers who had escaped German 
captivity or encirclement. Another 29,521 partisans had previously served in 
the “German army, police and [other] institutions,” more than ten percent of 
those partisans on whom data is available. Most of them were still alive by the 
late summer of 1944, and more than 16,000 ‘traitors-turned-partisans’ were 
eventually draft ed into the Red Army.71
Of those who survived the war, some likely hoped that their recent hero-
ism would help to conceal their earlier, much more problematic or implicated 
past. Others genuinely seemed to believe that the Soviet regime would forgive 
them; aft er all, it appeared to have done so during the war. Ivan Nizov, for in-
stance, was a Red Army offi  cer who early on fell into German captivity. From 
a prisoner-of-war camp in Prussia, he was taken to Breslau and put into the 
so-called Radionov brigade, named aft er its commander Vladimir Radionov, 
a Kuban Cossack and former Red Army offi  cer. In February 1943, Nizov’s unit 
was relocated to west Belorussia; six months later, the Radionov brigade, more 
than 3,500 men, went over to the Soviet side. For almost a year, Nizov fought 
with the partisans, reportedly killing many policemen and Germans. When 
the partisan movement was disbanded, he was arrested for fi ghting against 
the motherland and sentenced to ten years hard labor.72 In his  letter to Pono-
marenko, Nizov expressed his surprise and outrage at being labeled a trai-
tor: when going over to the partisans, they were told that “with our transfer, 
we had redeemed our guilt towards the motherland, and that not one fi nger 
70. Both quotes from NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 400, l. 202.
71. These numbers were compiled by the Belorussian Staff  of the Partisan Move-
ment (as of January 1946) on the basis of lists provided by the individual brigades and 
units. Quoted from NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 634, l. 1 (data on the partisan movement in 
Belorussia).
72. See Ivan Nizov’s letter to Ponomarenko, May 16, 1945: NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 472, 
ll. 211–19 (petitions to Ponomarenko). The Radionov brigade also goes by the name Rodi-
onov, Gil’-Radionov, or Radionov-Gil.
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would be laid on us. But the opposite happened. . . . why weren’t we arrested 
on the day when we went over to the partisans?”73
The so-called Radionov brigade, however, was no ordinary Wehrmacht 
formation. It was the SS brigade Druzhina I, temporarily attached to one of 
the most notorious SS formations, the Dirlewanger brigade. In the spring of 
1943, the Druzhina men took part in the largest German anti-partisan opera-
tion in Belorussia, in the course of which numerous villages were burned to 
the ground and up to 13,000 civilians killed.74 Ivan Nizov, however, stressed 
that he “never took part in the fi ght against partisans, neither actively nor 
passively” and that he also did not participate in any punitive actions against 
civilians, in particular not in the burning of the village Azartsy. During his 
interrogation, he signed a confession, but only so that he could escape the 
“moral and physical abuse by the investigators.” The crimes that he was ac-
cused of, Nizov wrote, were fi gments of his investigators’ imagination.75
Ivan Nizov appears not to have realized it, but he could call himself for-
tunate. As a member of an SS unit, he usually would have been sentenced to 
death, but the year that he fought with the partisans counted as a mitigating 
factor; ten years hard labor was a light sentence. The same happened to a man 
called Martynkevich, whom the NKVD military tribunal of Bobruisk region 
sentenced in 1948 to 25 years in the Gulag. During the war, Martynkevich had 
served for a year in the German police but then joined the partisans. As the 
NKVD military tribunal of Belorussia noted, however, the lower court failed to 
take into consideration that Martynkevich, upon disbandment of his partisan 
unit, had joined the Red Army. During his service, he was critically wounded, 
losing his left  leg as a result, and received several awards. In light of this, 
Martynkevich’s sentence was lowered to ten years.76
From a practical point of view, accepting policemen into partisan units 
made sense. In contrast to civilians, these men were experienced fi ghters, ac-
customed to the conditions of guerilla warfare (or rather, the fi ght against it) 
and in possession of weapons. Although their full redemption was impossi-
ble, partial redemption was. As I. Sakharov, head of the secret police military 
courts in Belorussia, put it in 1949, these men had “partly washed away their 
guilt towards the motherland with their blood.”77 It is debatable whether this 
was only a partial legal redemption or also a partial moral (or political) one. 
As Nizov and Martynkevich’s further fates are unknown, this question has 
to remain unanswered. Regardless, the postwar treatment of these men re-
mains striking: ‘traitors-turned-partisans’ were the only ones in whose cases 
73. Quoted from NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 472, l. 217.
74. This operation called Cottbus took place May 20–June 23, 1943 in the Begomel /΄
Lepel΄ region northeast of Minsk. Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen, 195–207. On the Radio-
nov/SS Druzhina I brigade and its participation in the destruction of villages and killing 
of locals, see Alexander Dallin and Ralph S. Mavrogordato, “Rodionov: A Case-Study in 
Wartime Redefection,” American Slavic and East European Review 18, no. 1 (1959): 25–33, 
here 27–28.
75. Both quotes from NARB f. 4p, op. 29, d. 472, l. 213.
76. NARB f. 4p, op. 62, d. 43, l. 38 (special reports from the military prosecutors and 
military tribunals). For similar cases: NARB f. 4p, op. 62, d. 43, ll. 275, 396.
77. NARB f. 4p, op. 62, d. 43, l. 396.
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Soviet military tribunals systematically took mitigating circumstances into 
account. In other words, on the one hand, the Soviet authorities maintained 
that the war had been a moral test that did not allow for pragmatic choices. 
On the other hand, the authorities were not only willing to accommodate 
their own pragmatic decisions, they also did not hold everyone accused of 
treason accountable to the same standard. These contradictory practices 
were brought about by the state’s balancing of diff erent objectives and inter-
ests, refl ecting tensions not only between ideology and pragmatism, but also 
within ideology. Perhaps no person exemplifi ed this better than Panteleimon 
Ponomarenko.
Confl icting Ideological Beliefs
In a February 1943 speech in front of the Central Committee of the Belorussian 
Communist Party in Moscow, Ponomarenko evoked pre-existing notions of 
enemies. Commenting on the situation in occupied territory, he indiscrimi-
nately spoke of policemen, mayors and village heads as locals chosen by the 
Germans from among the “remains of the shattered kulak class and bandit-
criminal elements,” noting that the partisans mercilessly exterminated all 
‘traitors.’78 The kulak theme was present from the very beginning of the war: 
in NKVD reports, “kulak elements” were oft en blamed for agitating against 
Soviet power and supporting the Germans. As NKVD offi  cer Vasilii Zasukhin 
wrote to Moscow in December 1941, “in the occupied territories, the kulaks 
display extraordinary counterrevolutionary energy.”79 Another reported that 
the Germans were choosing as village heads “former kulaks and other anti-
Soviet elements.”80 These images did not fade even as the punishment of the 
very same people believed to be enemies became less strict from the winter of 
1943/44 on—which could also explain why the Soviet authorities had no un-
derstanding for the moral gray zones of occupation. In a March 1945 speech, 
for example, Ponomarenko again pointed to the “remnants of the shattered 
kulak class” and “capitalist elements” as “enemies of the people and of Soviet 
power, forthright mercenaries of the German invaders.”81 This time he also in-
cluded various nationalists (Polish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian) among the en-
emies still present in Belorussia, some actively fi ghting against Soviet power, 
others mostly in hiding. In this and subsequent speeches, Ponomarenko put 
all the blame for the poor performance of collective farms in east Belorussia 
and the slow collectivization of west Belorussia on these groups that “pre-
cisely were the ones, as everybody knows, who worked for the Germans dur-
ing the occupation.”82
At the same time, Ponomarenko maintained that the war had been an all 
people’s war (vsenarodnaia voina). From the war’s very beginning, Ponoma-
78. Quoted from NARB f. 1440, op. 3, d. 522, l. 154 (Ponomarenko’s speeches and ar-
ticles, 1941–1943).
79. Quoted from NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 63, l. 29 (NKGB and NKVD reports about the 
situation in occupied territory).
80. Quoted from NARB f. 4p, op. 33a, d. 63, l. 49.
81. Quoted from NARB f. 1440, op. 3, d. 523, l. 163.
82. Quoted from NARB f. 1440, op. 3, d. 523, l. 340.
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renko played a crucial role in persuading Stalin that Soviet partisan warfare 
could only be successful if transformed into a mass struggle. In that sense, 
the recruitment of policemen into partisan units not only followed from prag-
matic considerations, but also represented the most extreme manifestation of 
this belief.83 Aft er the war, in his capacity as First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Belorussia, Ponomarenko was instrumental in shaping Belorussia’s 
specifi c role within the larger Soviet narrative of the all people’s war. As he 
highlighted at the May 9, 1945 victory celebrations in Minsk: “Hundreds of 
thousands of glorious sons of the Belorussian people joined partisan units. . . . 
Millions of people from Belorussia (milliony belorusskogo naselenii) helped 
the Red Army and the partisans, with an inextinguishable faith in the quick 
defeat of the German aggressors and the resurrection of Soviet power.”84 From 
the end of the war until the demise of the Soviet Union, such remarks on the 
mass participation and contribution of ‘ordinary people’ were common in 
many of the war-related articles published in Belorussia’s main newspaper, 
Sovetskaia Belorussiia. In January 1947, for example, Sovetskaia Belorussiia 
highlighted that “the all people’s partisan war (vsenarodnaia partizanskaia 
voina), which developed on Belorussian soil temporarily occupied by the en-
emy, represented a signifi cant contribution to the common cause of defeating 
the horde of German-Fascist robbers.”85 In other words, within the offi  cial im-
age of the war as an all people’s war, Belorussia’s specifi c contribution came 
to be the all people’s partisan war that had been made possible through the 
undivided support of the Belorussian people (belorusskii narod)—even, as 
Minsk and Moscow implied, in the regions that had only been annexed from 
Poland in 1939.86
As the example of Ponomarenko shows, both during and aft er the war, 
two beliefs existed at once: that the war exposed mass enemies in hiding, 
people who had been and would always be hostile to Moscow, and that the 
war revealed people’s mass support for Soviet rule. The state’s politics of ret-
ribution, then, refl ected not just tensions between ideology and pragmatism, 
specifi cally between the regime’s high moral standards and the accommoda-
tion of its own pragmatic choices. They were also shaped by tensions within 
Soviet ideology, resulting from two confl icting ideological beliefs. These sets 
of tensions not only co-existed, they oft en overlapped, not just in the cases 
of ‘traitors-turned-partisans,’ but also in the authorities’ behavior toward So-
viet specialists who had worked in German-overseen institutions, and even in 
Moscow’s treatment of the Soviet population as a whole that had lived under 
Nazi rule.
83. As argued by Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 43–44, 47.
84. Quoted from Sovetskaia Belorussiia, no. 85, May 10, 1945, 2.
85. Quoted from Sovetskaia Belorussiia, no. 2, January 3, 1949, 1–2.
86. For a few examples: Sovetskaia Belorussiia, no. 127, June 28, 1947, 2, “The parti-
sans of Belorussia in the fi ght for the motherland”; Sovetskaia Belorussiia, no. 219, Novem-
ber 3, 1948, 3, “A story about the partisan war”; Sovetskaia Belorussiia, no. 83, April 23, 
1950, 2–3, “A book about the partisan movement in Belorussia”; Sovetskaia Belorussiia, 
no. 152, July 3, 1956, 3, “The special day of the Belorussian people”; Sovetskaia Belorussiia, 
no. 84, April 10, 1960, 2, “The road to victory.”
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Lingering Suspicions
According to Moscow’s November 1943 instruction, minor employees of the 
German administration, as well as teachers, engineers, and others who had 
worked in German-overseen institutions, were not to be prosecuted if they 
had not committed any crimes. Aft er the war, the Soviet state usually contin-
ued to employ them in their respective fi elds of expertise, even in positions 
in which they had worked under the Germans. Teachers are a good example. 
Of the roughly 4,500 teachers who by June 1946 were working in Minsk re-
gion schools (excluding the city of Minsk), about 3,300 had lived in occupied 
territory, yet had not fought with the partisans. Of those, two thirds had en-
gaged in farm work, but some 1,100 had worked in schools or in other German 
institutions.87 This ratio was similar in other regions. Of the 50,172 teachers 
employed in Belorussia by the summer of 1947, 35,009 had stayed in occupied 
territory and had not joined the partisans. Around that time, the Ministry of 
Education conducted a thorough investigation of all schools and discovered 
that 2,157 educators had even received their training in prewar Poland or dur-
ing the German occupation. The report made no indication that these teachers 
should be dismissed, however.88 Rather, it called for extensive “retraining” 
(perepodgotovka) of educators who had lived in occupied territory. This in-
cluded extra evening and Sunday lectures on the correct ideological upbring-
ing of children, on Soviet patriotism, Marxism-Leninism, and the teaching of 
history in schools. Instructors were regularly sent out to the republic’s schools 
to monitor the success of the retraining measures.89
In continuing to employ people who had worked in German-overseen in-
stitutions, the need for qualifi ed labor, in particular for specialists working in 
industry, health care, education, and agriculture, played a crucial role. War 
and occupation had left  Belorussia utterly devastated: about 1.7 to 2 million 
people, or 19 to 22 percent of the population that by the summer of 1941 had 
lived in the territories that would constitute postwar Soviet Belorussia, were 
killed or died as a result of the war.90 Among the survivors, the number of lo-
cals who had worked under the Germans was signifi cant, as a December 1944 
report on the registration of Minsk’s population shows. In the fi ve months 
aft er the Soviets’ return to Minsk, the police had re-registered 100,156 people. 
Of these, 20,519 people, about one-fi ft h of the city population at that time, had 
worked in “German institutions” (v nemetskikh uchrezhdeniiakh), although it 
is unclear from the report what exactly “institutions” meant.91 If we factor in 
that not every inhabitant was of working age, then the number of those who 
had worked in German institutions during the war was, in proportion to the 
overall December 1944 labor force, even higher. For this reason (the lack of 
87. GAMO f. 1p, op. 9, d. 35, l. 6 (report on the schools in Minsk region).
88. NARB f. 4p, op. 17, d. 103, l. 8 (quote), ll. 12. (Belorussian Ministry of Education, 
report about its cadres).
89. NARB f. 4p, op. 17, d. 103, ll. 12–15, quote l. 12.
90. These are my own calculations. To speak of the republic’s ‘prewar population’ 
would be incorrect, given that the pre–1941 territory of Belorussia was larger than its post–
1944 territory. For similar numbers: Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 1158–60.
91. GAMO f. 1p, op. 2, d. 54, l. 125 (NKVD and NKGB special reports, Minsk region).
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personnel and the fact that many cadres had worked under the Germans), 
the Soviet regime put much emphasis on the education and training of recent 
high-school graduates. Yet, education took time. In the meantime, the Soviet 
authorities simply could not aff ord not to employ those who had worked in 
German institutions.
It is of course possible that once the fi rst round of postwar higher educa-
tion graduates entered the labor force, locals who had been employed in what-
ever capacity by the Germans were replaced by younger, untainted workers. 
Unfortunately, the Minsk region school reports aft er 1946 no longer provide 
information on how many teachers had not only stayed in occupied territory, 
but had also worked as teachers during that time. The total number of teach-
ers in Minsk region (excluding the city) had increased by the beginning of 
the 1950/51 school year, however, the number of those who had stayed in oc-
cupied territory had not decreased, but was even slightly higher than in June 
1946.92 Obviously, this increase could have been the result of recent gradu-
ates who had lived as teenagers in occupied territory but received their peda-
gogical training aft er 1944. Still, this indicates that having lived under Nazi 
rule did not categorically preclude one from the educational sector. It is also 
possible that the teachers’ gender mattered. Of the educators in Belorussia in 
1947, the majority, about sixty-eight percent, were women.93 My impression 
is that the Soviet authorities took a slightly diff erent view on locals’ passivity 
when it came to women. In their opinion, nothing could plausibly explain why 
an able-bodied man did not fi ght with the partisans but remained at home. 
Women, however, were deemed responsible for the care of children and older 
relatives. As such, they might have been less expected to live under very dif-
fi cult circumstances in the forests, without a steady food supply and adequate 
means of protecting themselves from cold weather, not to mention from sex-
ual harassment.94 If the authorities indeed held diff erent expectations of men 
and women, then the teachers’ gender might have worked to their advantage 
aft er the war, making it possible for women to be employed as teachers even 
if they had lived under Nazi rule, perhaps even worked as educators during 
the war.
At the same time, though, the Soviet authorities were highly suspicious 
of those who had been employed in German-overseen institutions. Given the 
enormity of the task, the secret police probably did not have the capacity to 
examine every worker’s wartime history, yet its members remained highly 
alert. In a June 1946 report to the Minsk regional party committee, A. Maksim-
enko, head of the administration of the Minsk region MGB, provided detailed 
information on some current teachers. One woman, Anastasiia Koren΄kova 
from the Vitebsk region, was accused of having married a German offi  cer dur-
92. GAMO f. 1p, op. 9, d. 118, l. 11 (Minsk executive committee report about the schools 
in Minsk region).
93. NARB f. 4p, op. 17, d. 103, l. 42.
94. On the ubiquity of sexual harassment, male sexual exploitation and strategic 
‘marriages,’ see Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 329–38. For the perspective of a female par-
tisan, see Sulia Wolozhinski Rubin, Against the Tide. The Story of an Unknown Partisan 
(Jerusalem, 1980), 109–20.
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Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union 627
ing the war.95 Another woman, Tereza Vykhota, had supposedly told a former 
student that “in the name of dialectical and historical materialism . . . [a] mil-
lion people died in this war” and that if it were not for the not-yet collectivized 
agricultural sector in west Belorussia, “we would all long ago have died of 
hunger.”96 Vykhota’s husband had been arrested and convicted in 1938. Dur-
ing the German occupation, she had taught history in a school in Molodechno 
district and allegedly used “fascist journals” in her classes. At the time of the 
report, she was a teacher of history and the constitution in a middle school in 
Minsk. Maksimenko, the head of the regional MGB administration, concluded 
that “teachers who had worked in German-organized schools raised Soviet 
children in the fascist counterrevolutionary-nationalist spirit, educated them 
to hate the Communist Party, and made them believe that the German army 
would bring down the Soviet Union.”97
It is unknown what happened to the women in Maksimenko’s report, al-
though it is very likely that some of them were eventually arrested for their 
wartime activities. Throughout the postwar years, the Soviet authorities 
continued to worry that investigations were not thorough enough, and that 
people who had worked under the Germans might be of harm to Soviet insti-
tutions. In his March 1948 report on the military courts’ work, Artimenkov, 
the military prosecutor of the MVD in Belorussia, cited the example of Vasilii 
Rubanov. During the German occupation, Rubanov headed the agricultural 
department in the Pukhovichi district’s administration. He was accused of 
having spread anti-Soviet propaganda, punishing locals for not fulfi lling 
his orders, and joining a counterrevolutionary organization, the German-
organized Soiuz bor΄by protiv bol s΄hevizma (Union of the Fight against Bolshe-
vism). Although Rubanov left  with the retreating Germans, he later returned 
to Belorussia and managed to conceal his past. By 1948, he was again working 
in his fi eld of expertise, employed by the Institute of Agriculture, which was 
affi  liated with the Academy of Sciences. As Artimenkov wrote, the Rubanov 
case showed that “such specialists, former active accomplices of the German-
Fascist occupiers, can not only be of no use whatsoever to those institutions 
and enterprises in which they work, but can also be of harm.” This was why, 
Artimenkov continued, it was necessary to conduct “much more rigorous ex-
aminations of the trustworthiness of those specialists” who had stayed in oc-
cupied territory and “to determine what they had done during that period.”98
The authorities’ suspicion, so clearly expressed in Artimenkov’s report, 
also extended beyond specialists who had worked in German-overseen in-
stitutions.99 The questionnaires (ankety) that one had to fi ll out before be-
ing admitted to university or beginning a new job always asked about the 
95. GAMO f. 1p, op. 2, d. 143, l. 570.
96. GAMO f. 1p, op. 2, d. 143, fi rst quote l. 561, second quote ll. 562.
97. Quoted from GAMO f. 1p, op. 2, d. 143, l. 560.
98. Both quotes from NARB f. 49, op. 29, d. 688, l. 390.
99. Berkhoff  locates this suspicion at the highest level, in and around Stalin’s inner 
circle: Berkhoff , Motherland in Danger, 223, 242. The suspicion also extended to Red Army 
soldiers who had fallen into German captivity and former civilian forced laborers. Briefl y: 
Penter, “Local Collaborators,” 351. Even former partisans were not exempt: Slepyan, Sta-
lin’s Guerrillas, 277.
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 whereabouts of that person during the war, specifi cally if someone had stayed 
in occupied territory.100 Those who answered in the positive had to fear being 
denied educational or professional opportunities, even if they had only been 
children during the war. In June 1946, for example, N.P. Dolzhenko from Niko-
laev region in southeastern Ukraine wrote to the Supreme Soviet. A teenager 
when the Germans occupied his native region, he was draft ed into the Red 
Army in 1944. Aft er the war, his commanders refused him entry into a military 
training school because he had lived under occupation (“byl v okkupatsii”).101 
Indeed, people could be denied educational opportunities not so much for 
what they themselves were suspected of having done, but for what their rela-
tives had done. In 1951, for instance, Aleksandr P., a medical student in Minsk, 
was expelled from university for having hidden crucial autobiographical in-
formation, namely the fact that his father had worked for the Germans as an 
agricultural specialist.102 This general suspicion of Soviet citizens who had 
stayed in occupied territory was, of course, profoundly at odds with the offi  -
cial narrative of the war as an all people’s war. Yet even if it lost some intensity 
over the years, it nevertheless lingered on for decades aft er the war.
The Ambivalent State
During the fi rst two years of Nazi-Soviet war, the punishment that Soviet mili-
tary tribunals meted out against Soviet citizens deemed ‘servants of the Ger-
mans’ was oft en severe and sweeping, to the point that Moscow grew alarmed. 
At the heart of the problem lay a lack of clarity about one crucial question: just 
what exactly had constituted treacherous behavior during the war? ‘Working 
under the Germans’ (rabotali u nemtsev), as party leaders and secret police 
offi  cers called it, was a nebulous, loose category. It could be understood to 
mean only those who had represented the occupation regime in the localities: 
policemen, mayors and village heads. It could, however, also be understood 
in a broader sense to encompass anyone who had worked in German-overseen 
institutions, for example teachers or offi  ce clerks. Throughout 1943, Moscow 
issued a series of legal instructions that were aimed at systematization and 
clarifi cation, and indeed, aft er the winter of 1943/44, punishment became less 
indiscriminate. From that time on, however, Soviet military courts also began 
to hand out lower sentences than they should have, at least according to Mos-
cow’s previous instructions. This moderation of punitive policies should not 
be mistaken for an increase in the due process of law: Soviet justice remained 
illiberal. Rather, it was brought about by shift ing political circumstances, 
100. The wording was as follows: “Did you live in territory that was temporarily oc-
cupied by the Germans during the [Great] Patriotic War (where, when, and job during 
that time)?” Quoted from the anketa of F. V. Prutnikov, January 7, 1947, NARB f. 4p, d. 29, 
op. 729, l. 392 (petitions to Ponomarenko).
101. Quoted from Dolzhenko’s letter: GARF f. 7523, op. 32, d. 443, l. 2 (petitions by 
repatriates and those who lived under occupation).
102. See P.’s letter (source No. 209) in: Aleksiandr Guzhaloŭski, ed., “. . . Milastsi Vashai 
prosim,” albo Adzin god v naveishai gistoryi Belarusi, adliustravany ŭ listakh, zaiavakh, 
skargakh i inshykh formakh zvarotu gramadzian (Minsk, 2006), 216–7. The editor did not 
publish last names.
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which led to a recalibration of state priorities. As the Red Army was recon-
quering more and more territory from the Germans, retribution evolved into a 
process in which diff erent objectives and interests had to be weighed against 
each other: reclaiming authority by way of punishment, yet also portraying 
the Soviet state as liberator and guarantor of justice, while facing a shortage 
of experienced personnel.
This balancing act, however, was not free of contradictions. On the one 
hand, Moscow thought of the war as a test that revealed people’s true loyalties, 
and thus showed no understanding for the moral gray zones of occupation. 
Correspondingly, external pressures and constraints did not count as mitigat-
ing factors in Soviet justice. On the other hand, the Soviet authorities were not 
only willing to accommodate their own pragmatic choices, they also did not 
hold everyone accused of treason accountable to the same standard. These 
inconsistent practices refl ected tensions between ideology and pragmatism, 
yet that alone does not suffi  ce as an explanation. They also arose because of 
confl icting ideological beliefs, namely that the war uncovered mass enemies 
in hiding, and that it revealed mass support for Soviet rule in the occupied ter-
ritories. These diff erent sets of tensions—between ideology and pragmatism 
and within ideology itself—co-existed and oft en overlapped, becoming vis-
ible not just in the case of ‘traitors-turned-partisans,’ but also in the regime’s 
treatment of Soviet specialists who had been employed in German-overseen 
institutions, as well as in its treatment of the Soviet population as a whole 
that had lived under Nazi rule. The kind of Soviet state that emerged from the 
Second World War, then, was at once powerful and insecure, able to quickly 
reassert its authority in the formerly German-occupied territories, yet at the 
same time deeply ambivalent about its politics of retribution.
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